

PERSONAL AND
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

MARIENLYST
CONFERENCE

9 - 11 May 1969

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

MARIENLYST
CONFERENCE

9 - 11 May 1969

CONTENTS

List of Participants	5
Introduction	9
First Item of the Agenda "Elements of instability in Western Society"	
Summary of and introduction to American working paper.	13
Summary of and introduction to German working paper	27
Discussion	32
Second Item of the Agenda "Conflicting attitudes within the Western World towards relations with the USSR and the other Communist States of Eastern-Europe in the light of recent events"	
Summary of and introduction to International working paper	43
Discussion	48

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN:

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF THE NETHERLANDS

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE:

ERNST H. VAN DER BEUGEL

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES:

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

HONORARY TREASURER:

JOHANNES MEYNEN

OBSERVER: H.R.H. PRINCESS BEATRIX OF THE NETHERLANDS

AGNELLI, GIOVANNI	ITALY
ALBERT, MICHEL	INTERNATIONAL
ALTMANN, RUEDIGER	GERMANY
BALL, GEORGE W.	UNITED STATES
BAUMGARTNER, WILFRID S.	FRANCE
BELL, DANIEL	UNITED STATES
BENEDIKTSSON, BJARNI	ICELAND
BENNETT, SIR FREDERIC	UNITED KINGDOM
BENTHEM VAN DEN BERGH, GODFRIED VAN	NETHERLANDS
BERCHTOLD, WALTER	SWITZERLAND
BIRGI, M. NURI	TURKEY
BISSELL, CLAUDE	CANADA
BROOKE, EDWARD W.	UNITED STATES
CADIEUX, MARCEL	CANADA
CARIGLIA, ANTONIO	ITALY
CAVAZZA, FABIO LUCA	ITALY
COLLADO, EMILIO G.	UNITED STATES

CZERNETZ, KARL
DAHRENDORF, RALF
DEAN, ARTHUR H.
DENMARK, PRINCE HENRIK OF
DUCHENE, L. FRANCOIS
FELDT, K.O.
FONTAINE, FRANCOIS
GREEN, JOHANNES
GRIFFIN, ANTHONY G.S.
HAMILTON, DENIS
HAMILTON, EDWARD K.
HARTLING, POUL
HAUGE, GABRIEL
HEATH, EDWARD
HEINZ II, HENRY J.
HELDING, JEROME L.
HØEGH, LEIF
JANSSEN, DANIEL
JORDAN JR., VERNON E.
KAMPMANN, JENS
KENISTON, KENNETH
KOCH, HANS H.
KOHNSTAMM, MAX
KRAG, JENS O.
KROGH, PETER F.
LANGE, HALVARD M.
LANGSLET, LARS R.
LENDVAI, PAUL
LITTEN, JENS
LUCHSINGER, FRED
LUNS, JOSEPH M.A.H.
MCKINNEY-MØLLER, MAERSK
MCLUHAN, MARSHALL
MCMAMARA, ROBERT S.
MORSE, DAVID A.
MOYERS, BILL D.
NETHERLANDS, PRINCE CLAUS OF THE
NYKOPP, JOHAN A.
OTTONE, PIERO
REVERDIN, OLIVIER

AUSTRIA
GERMANY
UNITED STATES
DENMARK
INTERNATIONAL
SWEDEN
FRANCE
DENMARK
CANADA
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
DENMARK
UNITED STATES
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
BELGIUM
UNITED STATES
DENMARK
UNITED STATES
DENMARK
INTERNATIONAL
DENMARK
UNITED STATES
NORWAY
NORWAY
AUSTRIA
GERMANY
SWITZERLAND
NETHERLANDS
DENMARK
CANADA
INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL
UNITED STATES
NETHERLANDS
FINLAND
ITALY
SWITZERLAND

RICHARDSON, ELLIOT L.
RITTERBACH, MANFRED E.
ROBERTS, SIR FRANK
ROCKEFELLER, DAVID
ROLL, SIR ERIC
ROTHSCHILD, BARON EDMOND DE
RUSK, DEAN
SANDEGREN, KAARE
SCHLEIMANN, JØRGEN
SCHMELZER, W. K. NORBERT
SCHMIDT, HELMUT
SØRENSEN, S. O.
STAERCKE, ANDRÉ DE
STONE, SHEPARD
TERKELSEN, TERKEL M.
TIDEMAND, OTTO G.
ULLMANN, MARC
UMBRIGHT, VICTOR H.
URI, PIERRE F.
VALLARINO GANCIA, LORENZO
WAGNER, GERRIT A.
WALLENBERG, MARCUS
WOITRIN, MICHEL
WOLFF VON AMERONGEN, OTTO
YLVISAKER, PAUL

IN ATTENDANCE:

ASBECK, HENRIK J. BARON VAN
CITTADINI CESI, MARCHESE GIAN G.
MAROTT, OLE
ROY, BERTIE LE
VERNÈDE, EDWIN

UNITED STATES
GERMANY
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
UNITED KINGDOM
FRANCE
UNITED STATES
NORWAY
DENMARK
NETHERLANDS
GERMANY
DENMARK
BELGIUM
UNITED STATES
DENMARK
NORWAY
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
FRANCE
ITALY
NETHERLANDS
SWEDEN
BELGIUM
GERMANY
UNITED STATES

NETHERLANDS
ITALY
DENMARK
NETHERLANDS
NETHERLANDS

INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth Bilderberg Meeting was held at Hotel Marienlyst in Elsinore (Denmark) on 9, 10 and 11 May 1969 under the Chairmanship of H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands.

There were approximately 85 participants from the United States, Canada and 14 Western European countries as well as from various international organizations. They consisted of members of governments, politicians, prominent businessmen, journalists, leading national and international civil servants and outstanding representatives of the academic world and other groups.

In accordance with the rules adopted at each Meeting, all participants spoke in a purely personal capacity without in any way committing whatever government or organization to which they might belong. In order to enable participants to speak with the greatest possible frankness the discussions were confidential, with no representatives of the press being admitted.

The Agenda was as follows:

- I. Elements of instability in Western Society.
- II. Conflicting attitudes within the Western World towards relations with the USSR and the other Communist States of Eastern Europe in the light of recent events.

ITEM I

ELEMENTS OF INSTABILITY IN WESTERN SOCIETY

H.R.H. The Prince of the Netherlands opened the Meeting and recalled the Bilderberg rules of procedure.

The Prince proposed to send a telegram to His Majesty the King of Denmark in order to express the gratitude of the conference for the hospitality in Denmark. Another telegram was sent to Mr. Lamping - who had resigned as Deputy Secretary General - in which he and Mrs. Lamping were thanked for all the work they had done for the Bilderberg Meetings.

The Prince announced that Professor Pasmazoglou of Greece, who was invited to come to the conference, was prevented to do so by the Greek authorities.

H.R.H. mentioned that for the first time there was a substantial group of much younger people among the participants and expressed his hope that the discussion between the "generations" would be fruitful.

* * *

The background for discussion of this item of the Agenda consisted of two papers by a United States participant and by a German participant, which had been distributed before the meeting.

SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN WORKING PAPER ON SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

INTRODUCTION

For anyone considering the United States little more than a decade ago, a question about the sources of political and social instability would seem an improbable one. The United States was then seemingly at the height of its powers. The communist world, after the 1956-57 events in Poland and Hungary, was apparently falling into disarray. Domestically, there had been eight years of relatively high prosperity at stable prices. The threat of radical-right extremism, in the shadow of Joe McCarthy and his depredations, had faded away. Social justice for the Negroes was under way. Like the public personality of President Eisenhower himself, the country seemed bland, selfassured and

eager to advance the broad, if platitudinous, conceptions of universalism in foreign affairs and progress at home.

There were some small clouds on the horizon. Economic growth had slowed down so that by the end of the decade it was no longer rising at a sufficient rate to match the increases in the labor force and in productivity. At the same time, unemployment had risen to more than 6 percent of the labor force. But because the greater number of unemployed were black and unskilled, with little means for becoming politically effective, the unemployment situation, for the while, was ignored. Toward the end of this term, President Eisenhower began running a large budget deficit to increase demand, but the effort did not reach a growing number of "hard-core" unemployed.

The paradox of the Kennedy administration was that its very élan, and activism, the need to seem and be effective in many respects, both in the foreign field as well as at home, stimulated and unleashed the forces of turbulence which rack the United States today.

It would be absurd to assume that such agitation and turbulence might not have come to the fore. The classic illustration of the trajectory of expectations, first laid down by de Tocqueville and repeated tediously since then by social scientists, tells us that no society which promises justice and slowly begins to open the way, having admitted the legitimacy of the claims, can expect to ride out the consequent whirlwind in a comfortable fashion. But along with the rising tumult of the blacks and the disadvantaged came an ambiguous war, and the combination of the two, which reinforced each other, has led to rising domestic violence, the alienation of the youth, and the growing challenge to the legitimacy of the system among the intelligentsia and the leadership cadres of the young, all of which have brought into question the very stability of the system itself.

It would be equally foolish to assume that immediate and manifest causes, important as they are, can wholly disorient a society as large and powerful as the United States. Underneath, there have occurred upheavals, sociological and technological, which have been reworking the social structure of the society. These changes, four in number—the simultaneous creation of an urban society, a national polity, a communal society, and a postindustrial world—will outlast the immediate vicissitudes of the war and poverty and continue to create deeper upheavals and tensions in the society. And beyond these structural changes in the society lie three other areas of difficulty which will profoundly affect the future of the United States: the relation of democracy to empire and the question whether any democracy can maintain an imperial role; the participation revolution, with its challenge to technocratic and meritocratic modes of decision making; and the profound changes in culture, with funda-

mental anti-rational and anti-intellectual bias in the arts and in the modes of experience and sensibility.

Considering the future of the United States one has to deal with these three dimensions: the immediate political and social upheavals; the structural changes; and the fundamental questions of value and cultural choices. And if one is to consider these questions in the light of the problem of social and political instability, one must also turn, at first, to the consideration, at the level of sociological theory, of those factors which precipitate instability and revolution or counter-revolution in a society.

THE SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

The key question for any political system — this is the triumph of Max Weber over Marx in contemporary social thought — is the legitimacy of the system. As S. M. Lipset has written:

Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved.

While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs.

(S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*; New York, 1963, p. 64)

If one looks at Western political society in the twentieth century, one can identify seven factors which, in varying combinations, have resulted in the social instability of the society and the consequent loss of legitimacy for the political system:

1. The existence of unemployment as an insoluble problem of the 1930s;
2. The existence of a parliamentary impasse (Italy, Portugal and Spain in the 1920s and 1930s);
3. The growth of private violence which led to the breakdown of authority (Germany);
4. The disjuncture of sectors (industrialization and traditional agriculture: Brazil);
5. Multi-racial or multi-tribal conflicts (India, Nigeria) and differences between language groups (Belgium, Canada);

6. The alienation of the intelligentsia;

7. Humiliation in war (Wilhelminian Germany and Tzarist Russia).

Within this framework one can identify as the sources of instability and strain in the United States: the Vietnam war, the alienation of youth, the rancor of the blacks and the multiplicity of social problems which derive from the structural changes in the society.

THE BREAK-UP OF CONSENSUS

A society mobilized to meet an external threat, where that threat can be unambiguously defined, unifies a country.

The United States in the 1950s was a mobilized society. It was mobilized, primarily, to meet the threat of international communism. After an initial demobilization in 1946-1947, there came a rapid build-up of arms. The Korean war brought about a vast expansion of a conventional arms force. NATO and SEATO extended these arms, under a presumed nuclear shield, around the world, and for the first time in American history a permanent military establishment had been created.

By the end of the 1950s, the situation had changed. International communism was no longer a monolith. Evil no longer seemed unambiguous. Different kinds of communism had come to the fore. The United States was in the quixotic position of providing aid to Tito and even to Gomulka. If the Soviet Union was still expansionist, that aggressiveness was more and more defined in traditional great-power terms than as ideological fervor. The moralism which had animated American foreign policy for a decade, particularly in the rhetoric of John Foster Dulles, had become attenuated. Ironically, moralism, a feature of the American style, was increasingly taken over by the opponents of the society, by the New Left, who began to characterize the United States in the same "totalistic" terms (as evil, sick, and bankrupt) as the United States previously had characterized its political enemy, and who began to picture American society itself in monolithic terms by such phrases as "the system", etc.

Looked at historically, it is the 1950s, not the 1960s, that are the exception. The degree of national consensus, in part through willing agreement, in part through the silence of those who felt cowed, was itself momentary. What one sees, then, in the 1960s, is the resumption of an historic leftism in American and other societies. This leftism itself has no unified character. It is in part (in origin, at least) the drive towards "inclusion" in the society, particularly of the blacks and the poor; it is also, especially among the literary intelligentsia, part of the cultural rebellion, an anti-bourgeois attitude, and finally, it takes on the features of anarchism and nihilism, a revolt against the increasing pressures of the technocratic organization of life in the society.

THE TENSION OF INCLUSION

The most obvious point of strain in American society, domestically, is race. The militancy of the blacks, the fact of riot, the threat of further strife are pervasive. How did it all come about?

The primary clue to the changing political role of the American Negro is the recent, and remarkable, demographic shift. In 1910, about ninety percent of the Negroes in the United States lived in the South. As late as 1950, sixty-eight percent still lived there. 1960 was the "dividing year"; at that point half the Negro population was now in the North, and the balance has been shifting strongly in this decade.

It was not only that the Negro has been leaving the South; he has become urbanized as well. In 1910, just about three-fourths of the Negroes lived in rural areas; by 1960, almost three-fourths of them lived in cities. In 1960, in fact, for the first time in American history, American Negroes had become more urban than whites.

Another social development - the movement, sometimes a flight - of the white population to the suburbs left the Negro population with the possibility of developing political power within the central city limits.

This changing demographic and political map allows us to see how the black community begins to be able to mobilize effective social power. But by itself it does not explain the trajectory of the "civil rights revolution" the emergent black nationalism, or the temper of the black militants.

The turning point in the civil rights revolution was, clearly, the Supreme Court decision in May, 1954, which struck down the principle of segregation in public schools. In so doing, it emphasized the meaning of the term *equality* as the overriding value in judging social change. It stated that blacks should have full and equal access to public facilities and services in the nation. But there were two further sociological consequences of this decision. One was the fact that the highest court in the land had legitimated the demands of the Negroes; and, second, that the moral initiative had passed into the hands of the blacks. The burden of proof was now no longer on the Negro but on the white.

Since that year a number of distinct gains for the Negro population in the field of income and education have been registered.

These advances mask, however, a more complicated aspect of mobility in the American social structure. If one looks at the various studies of achievement in the United States, most notably the so-called Coleman-Report on performance in the schools, it is clear that not race but social class is the primary variable. The educational achievement of a child is associated primarily with class and milieu rather than with race, religion, or color. The crucial point, of course, is

that racial discrimination has been one of the chief means of maintaining class distance, and this has become the source of attack by the blacks. Thus, the current demand of the young, militant, and aggressive new leadership of the blacks is primarily for open admission of all blacks to colleges, often regardless of performance or standards, since college is clearly seen as the major route of social mobility. One of the major variables, therefore, in any assessment of future strain in the society is the measure of the blacks' success in changing the class balance of the society.

This drive for inclusion is, in a radical way, accompanied by a cultural and psychological mood which, paradoxically, emphasizes revolutionary sentiments. The fact that the blacks are such a small minority of the country – though a large proportion of the major urban areas – makes a genuine revolutionary situation enormously difficult. If the black community achieves a sense of rapid enough inclusion in the society – and this is as much a subjective question as an objective one – the revolutionary language of the black intelligentsia will become, if it persists, an empty ideology and mere rhetoric. If the sense of failure increases then the mood of resentment will lead to further riots and strife.

THE CRISIS OF CREDIBILITY

The sense of disorientation, clearly, is widespread in the United States today. The alienation of the young and the militancy of the blacks are widely publicized phenomena. The rapidity of social change is always unsettling to large masses of the population, and the sense of rapid social change, technological and sociological, is perceived everywhere. A recent Gallup poll on the feelings of Americans about religion shows a deep pessimism and a remarkable shift of mood within the last decade.

How does one account for the change of mood in this decade? Four factors can be indicated:

1. THE MULTIPLICITY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In the decade and a half after World War II it was believed that economic growth would, in time, solve all social problems. The Kennedy administration, as a Democratic administration, turned its eyes more readily than the previous, Republican administration to domestic affairs. It sought to make its record in that field. But that very effort focussed public attention on questions that previously had been ignored: poverty, housing, education, medical care, urban sprawl, environmental pollution, and the like. On the one hand, there was the recognition of the poor. On the other, there was the psychological fact, as first remarked by Bertrand de Jouvenel, that families were finding that their

incomes had doubled, but that they were not living twice as well as before. It is clear that the rapidly heightened awareness of these multiple social questions has been instrumental in creating a sense of instability in the society.

2. THE BLACK RIOTS AND CRIME

From 1963 to 1967 there were "five hot summers" in which, each year, there was a crescendo of rioting that, beginning in the south, passed quickly to the north, so that in Watts, Detroit, Newark and Washington, sections of each city went up in smoke. The Kerner Commission reports have shown that none of these riots was organized. In each instance, a small event, usually an instance of police brutality, or alleged police brutality, became a flare of wild rumors and the tinderbox exploded. As in any social movement, wild, episodic, rampaging behavior signals a first phase of action. The next phase is an effort to create more disciplined militant actions. In the black communities today, many contradictory currents are at work. There is predominantly the black nationalism which now seeks to build distinct black institutions, and makes militant demands for resources towards those goals. But there are also movements such as the Black Panthers which emphasize guerilla tactics and which are ready to link up with white radical movements.

The growth of black militancy is in considerable measure responsible for covert white "backlashes", a series of actions expressed most vividly for a while, in the Wallace movement.

Typically, the support for Wallace in the north came mainly from blue-collar workers and the ethnic groups in which they predominate, for the simple reason that these groups, in status adjacent to the blacks, have felt the most threatened.

Many of these fears are summed up in the issue of "law and order" and are focussed principally on crime. Crime is a form of "unorganized" class struggle, and the lowest groups in the society have always committed a disproportionate number of crimes. What was in the past true of the Irish and the Italians is true of the Negroes today. But Negro crime is more "visible", and, meshed with the general tensions in the society, it causes more comment and fear.

3. THE ALIENATION OF YOUTH

One can find many sources for the growing alienation of youth in America – and in any advanced industrial society. There is a common structural source, which is the dropping of an "organizational harness" on youth, and at an earlier and earlier age. The student rebellions today are, to simplify, the beginning "class struggles" of the post-industrial society.

A post-industrial society has many features, but the principal one is the

changed educational requirements in the society. An educational system which used to reflect the status structure of the society now becomes the *determinant* of class position in the society. The second fact is that the work of the post-industrial society becomes more and more technical and, in the increasing specialization and division of labor, one finds a bureaucratization of intellectual employment, just as earlier there occurred the breakdown of skills among artisans and skilled mechanics.

In American society one finds these features among the youth. There is a striking change of cohort, an increase of about one-third in their number, and a consequent sense of increased competition for place. There is a reduction of the status of the college. A generation ago, going to college was still a distinctive fact about status. Today, in the elite schools, more than 85 percent of the graduates go on to some post-graduate work, so that in these places the college becomes simply a way-station. A college degree is no longer the means of stepping into the high plateau of society; rather, advancement involves a continual process of professional training and retraining in order to keep up with the new techniques and new knowledge being produced. In short, much of the alienation of the young is a reaction to the social revolution that has taken place in their own status.

4. THE VIETNAM WAR

If there is any single element which is the catalyst of all social tensions in the United States, and perhaps even in the world, it is the Vietnam War. The war is without parallel in American history. It is perceived as morally ambiguous, if not dubious, by a large portion, perhaps the majority of the population. And in the conduct of the war there has arisen a critical problem of creditability which, in extreme cases, is threatening to become a problem of legitimacy for the society.

The creditability problem arose simply because the official optimism of the Administration, particularly during 1964 and 1965, was belied by events. But obviously it has not been a problem of creditability alone. There is the moral question that the means employed have been highly disproportionate to the ends.

For the young, the Vietnam war has been the single most direct source of alienation. The draft has increased anxiety about careers and the future. Service in the armed forces is often regarded as at best a waste of years and at worst an immoral complicity. Impotent themselves in affecting the course of national policy – or so they have thought – the student generation has turned its fury against the University as a symbol of the society. In turning against the society any relation with government becomes suspect, and in the “dis-

tancing” of the student from the society, “the system” becomes a reified villain guilty of all crimes. It is this estrangement of a large section of the future “elite” of the society from the society which is the greatest cost of the Vietnam war. Whether that estrangement can be overcome is equally one of the great questions about the source of future stability of the United States.

THE STRUCTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

At present there are four major structural changes in the society. The first is the demographic transformation, the second the creation of a national society, the third the emergence of a communal society, and the fourth a post-industrial society. All these are taking place almost simultaneously. It is the synchronism of these multiple revolutions which, *au fond*, has generated so many strains in the social system.

1. THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION

Since the end of World War II, there have been three major demographic changes in the United States. The first has been a large population expansion, the second the rapid urbanization of the country, and the third the racial transformation of the central cities of the major urban areas.

President Johnson has pointed out in 1967 in his “Message on the Cities”: “In the remainder of this century urban population will double, city land will double, and we will have to build in our cities as much as all that we have built since the first colonists arrived on these shores. It is as if we had forty years to rebuild the entire urban United States”.

It is this vast demographic and ecological upheaval which frames the present and future tasks of American society.

2. THE NATIONAL SOCIETY

The United States is, for the first time, a national society. It has long been a “nation” in the sense of achieving a national identity and a national symbolism. But it is only in the last thirty years, because of the revolution in communication and transportation, that the United States has become a national society in the fundamental sense that changes taking place in one section of the society have an immediate and repercussive effect in all the others. One can see this most clearly in the “contagion effects” of the race situation.

There are three broad problems which one can identify as a consequence of the emergence of a national society.

a. The fact that social problems become national in scope. The ease of migration throughout the country and the variability in conditions add burdens to particular parts.

b. The inadequacy of the present administrative structure. The United States is composed of 50 states and there are 80,000 municipalities, each with its own tax and sovereign powers. This is not decentralization, but disarray. The extraordinary fact is that while the United States has the most modern economy in the world, its polity remains Tudor in character, antiquated and top heavy with a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions. The failure to achieve an efficient administrative structure is itself a contributing element to the inability of cities or regions to have any effective planning.

c. The rise of plebiscitary politics. In the United States there has been an eclipse of spatial distance. One of the consequences is to make Washington the central cockpit for all political argument and to focus attention on a single source. Given the possibilities for violence which have been endemic in the system, a new source of great strain has been created by the emergence of a national society. The possibilities of organizing direct mass pressure, as a means whereby any group can obtain its demands becomes a further source of structural strain in the system.

3. THE COMMUNAL SOCIETY

The emergence of a communal society derives from two factors: the growth of non-market public decision making, and the definition of social rights in group, rather than individual, terms. In scale, both are distinctly new on the American scene, and both pose new kinds of problems for the society.

a. By non-market public decision making, is meant simply the growth of problems which have to be settled by the public authorities, rather than through the market mechanism. The laying out of roads, the planning of cities, the organization of health care, the payment for education, the cleaning up of environmental pollution, the building of houses, all become matters of public concern. Decision making has thus become politicalized and subject to all the multiple, direct pressures of political decision making. This can lead to the prediction that in the coming years there will be more and more group conflicts in the society. To meet this, one has to try and see that such conflicts do not take place along a single dimension (such as race or class), and thus polarize society. Second, one has to begin to establish mechanisms of political bargaining between groups.

b. By group rights, one means that claims on the community are decided on the basis of group membership rather than on individual distinctions.

The demand for group rights will widen in the society, because social life increasingly becomes organized on a group basis. The need to work out philosophical legitimations and political mechanisms to adjudicate these conflicting claims will be another source of strain in the society in coming years.

4. THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

In a post-industrial society, which is only now beginning to emerge, we may see fundamental changes in the institutional structure of the society that will transform the stratification system of the society, principally in the bases of class position and the modes of access to such position. The idea of a post-industrial society is not meant to be a total picture of social change. Industrial societies such as the USA, the USSR, Germany and Japan have been organized politically in different ways, and similarly the post-industrial society can assume varying political forms.

Emphasis should be laid on one dimension of the post-industrial society: the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy analysis in the society. One can see this in the changing relation of science to technology, and of economic theory to economic policy. What it suggests, in sum, is that technological advance and economic growth in a society become increasingly dependent on the codification of theoretical knowledge and on the technical character of policy analysis. Technique, however, can never define the goals of a society, yet the choice of means, to the extent that they affect goals, provides a greater power for technocrats in the society. The tension between technocratic and political decision making will become one of the chief features of a post-industrial society.

THE FUTURE: THE SHORT AND LONG RUN

The immediate, pervasive question before the society is not the issue of the blacks, tense as this is, but the alienation of the sensitive young. The drive of the blacks is still for inclusion in the society, even though many want this on their terms (e.g. an education adapted to black needs), and the problem is the transfer of resources to meet those demands.

The mood of the radical and revolutionary young is more diffuse and inchoate. There is no sense of a coherent set of demands, other than a generalized attack on prevailing middle-class values which traditionally, in bourgeois terms, means delayed gratification, psychological restraints, and rationalistic and technocratic modes of thought. The Vietnam war has given a sharp and immediate focus to their discontents. For a small and significant group this has led to a complete alienation from the society and the readiness to become "urban guerillas" in an effort to destroy the society, and, failing that, the University as a symbol of the society.

Moral questions apart, the ending of the Vietnam war is a necessary condition for the future stability of the United States. Only a quick end to this war will reduce many of the tensions felt by the young; only the redirection

of resources (about \$ 30 billion a year) can begin to meet the problems of the blacks and the poor.

But clearly the ending of the Vietnam war is only the beginning. The many problems identified above, particularly those deriving from the structural changes in American life, remain. Beyond these, however, are five more generalized problems which a troubled society has only begun to be aware of and has yet to confront.

1. THE RELATION OF DEMOCRACY TO EMPIRE

The United States after World War II could not go back to its earlier status of a parochial power, with its national life, as in the 1920s and before, dominated by the small town mentalities which had ruled it for so long. The United States became an imperial power not because of any economic motivations but because, as the strongest power, it was drawn (and went) into the ensuing contest of will in all areas of the world, and thus it began to exert a predominant influence, if not hegemony.

An imperial role is difficult for any nation, since it means the commitment of large-scale resources, of men and wealth, which either have to be returned with profit or which cause deep strain within. The relation between democracy and empire is especially trying, and increasingly one can see that the imperial role is not one that is fitting, in political structure and national style, for the United States.

2. THE CREATION OF A NEW POLITICAL ELITE

An elite, at best, as in an Establishment, serves as a source of moral authority and political wisdom. What has been interesting about the United States is that in the decade and a half following World War II, a more or less coherent political elite emerged that provided, in the area of foreign policy, a degree of leadership. An elite is sometimes defined by its structural position in a society, but the fact that men possess economic or political or military power, or stand at the pinnacle of an organization, does not necessarily mean they are an elite, in the sense that their leadership is followed. In the United States the elite that emerged was defined more by outlook – a cosmopolitan and worldwide vision—rather than by structural position alone.

In the last decade, the influence of that major political elite has been disappearing, and no comparable elite has arisen to temper policy and to provide a source of judgment. The Kennedy administration sought, self-consciously, with its panache and élan, to constitute itself as an elite, and among the intellectuals and the young it gained an enthusiastic following if not a moral authority. But this ended with the death of the young President.

Given the divisions in the society, the question whether an elite can emerge is moot. If one follows the wisdom of a Bagehot, the existence of such an elite is a necessary element in the creation of political authority in the society. Without such an elite there is a problem of authoritative leadership.

3. THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM?

To a considerable extent, liberal social policy was associated with the rise of Keynesianism and macro-economic planning. Economists have become highly influential in government under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. They became managers as well (the McNamara revolution in the Pentagon).

But in recent years there has been a growing skepticism about the ability of economists to manage the economy, as one sees in the case of Britain.

In social policy, particularly in the United States, the record of social scientists is even more dismal. In the areas of education, welfare, and social planning, there has been little knowledge that one can draw upon for policy purposes. Social scientists have reluctantly begun to admit that the problems are more “complex” than they thought.

The failure of liberalism, then, is in part a failure of knowledge. This is not an answer to the liking of the New Left, which still presses for the easy simplicisms. Yet this, too, is a source of intellectual disarray and concern when one realizes that a large, complex society, especially one that necessarily has to be “future-oriented”, requires social planning in order to meet the onrush of social change.

4. THE PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION

What is evident everywhere is a society-wide uprising against bureaucracy, and a desire for participation, a theme that is summed up in the phrase “People ought to be able to affect the decisions that control their lives”.

This upheaval from below takes many forms. In part, it is a revolt against the idea of a meritocracy in which technical achievement alone becomes the criterion of place in the society; in part, as in the case of the blacks, it is a form of community self-assertion. Certainly the older political forms are no longer adequate to meet this challenge.

To a considerable extent, the participation revolution is one form of reaction against the “professionalization” of society, and the emergent technocratic decision making of a post-industrial society. And every advanced industrial society will have to confront this phenomenon. What began years ago in the factory through the trade unions has now spread to the neighbourhood – because of the politicalization of decision making in social affairs, described above in the section on the communal society – and will, in the coming years, spread to

organizations as well. The older bureaucratic models of hierarchically organized, centralized organizations functioning through an intensive specialization and division of labor clearly will have to be overhauled.

Yet "participatory democracy" is not the panacea its adherents make it out to be. It is only one more way of posing the classical issues of political philosophy: namely, who should make, and at what levels of government, what kind of decisions for how large a social unit? And there are no clearcut answers to these questions. But the questions will remain, and they will become exacerbated.

5. THE CHANGE IN CULTURAL SENSIBILITY

The change of life style which was once restricted to a small group of artists and was largely hidden from the society has now become the property of many and is constantly publicized in the media and the films. What is clear is that the dominant mode in this new cultural sensibility is anti-intellectual and anti-rational, and this poses a very different question.

Philosophy has had its anti-intellectual currents and literature has been anti-rational. Yet always they were constrained by the shaping discipline of art or the efforts to establish discourse. So far, at least, the new currents simply remain at the level of anti-art.

Normally this would be a problem for the culture alone. But there are crucial sociological problems as well. For the new style in culture spills over into politics and seeks to justify the destruction of civility and discourse. At its most extreme, it seeks to substitute aesthetics, it becomes a justification of the gesture, and of the extreme act.

Beyond this is another, more troublesome fact: that what we are witnessing is an extreme disjunction between the culture and the social structure, the one devoted to apocalyptic attitudes, the other to technocratic decision making. How a society can live with such a disjunction is a thorny question for the future.

CODA

The long-range question is whether the diremption of the culture and social structure may not be too deep to be bridged, and whether the coherence of the society may be in jeopardy. In between are the questions which affect the broad mass of persons, their anxieties, their needs, their willingness to bear the costs of change and the degree of backlash which might arise from individuals whose status is threatened. The first requisite for action is intelligent leadership, and this is the most problematic question of all - for any society.

SUMMARY OF THE GERMAN WORKING PAPER ON SOURCES OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN DEVELOPED SOCIETIES

The author of the German working paper agreed with the thesis of the author of the American working paper that only ten years ago it was generally believed that the end of dramatic political antagonism, the end of ideology, had arrived. The new society was to be a society of stable progress towards more prosperity and less unrest. There was only the fear of some intellectuals that pressures toward conformity within a democratic and bureaucratic society might become a new source of strain.

In recent years we have seen that a number of events have turned the stable and pacified society upside down. Many underprivileged minorities feel strongly that their problems have not been solved at all (e.g. coloured people in the us). In a pacified society like Sweden more and more people "opt out" by drink or drugs. Regionalism and regional nationalism celebrate unexpected triumphs and the party system has become a dubious vehicle of expressing the "democratic class struggle".

In short, there are many manifestations of conflict in modern societies, some familiar, but most quite unfamiliar. There is moreover a growing sense that such conflicts are likely to grow rather than shrink in intensity. It has become necessary to reconsider such ideas as "the end of ideology", "pluralist society", or "democratic class struggle" in order to understand the motive forces of the developed world.

SOURCES OF CONFLICT

A first reason for conflict in modern society is the old class struggle about citizenship. To enjoy the benefits of equal rights of participation it takes more than promises written into constitutions or universal suffrage. Both remain empty formulae if and when the individual is unable to exercise his rights for social reasons. At the present time there are many people in all developed countries whose social position does not enable them to make full use of their citizenship rights.

A psychological reason for this situation is that there is a great social distance of information and of motivation between the world of working class families and the institutions of developed society like the institutions of higher learning, those administering justice or even those providing health care. Here, the psychological conditions of effective citizenship are missing, and the attempt to create them becomes the source of new political conflicts.

This is even more evident with respect to the exercise of authority in many institutions, including schools and universities as well as business enterprises,

armies and churches. Everywhere, those in dependent or inferior positions demand to be treated as equals in rank, or in any case as citizens who must not be pushed around as they still are today. Often, this demand takes the form of a wish for formal participation in the process of decision making.

There is also an economic reason for the incompleteness of citizenship rights. This is the replacement of class inequalities by sectoral disparities of development. A modern, growth-oriented economy almost by necessity leads to new forms of privilege. At any given time, certain sectors of the economy are more favourably off than others; those who by accident or tradition earn their living in these sectors find themselves in a very different position from those who do not.

However, both implications of the development of citizenship rights – the survival of pre-modern attitudes and the emergence of sectoral disparities – have one feature in common. They concern relatively minor problems in comparison to the overwhelming strain caused in the 19th and early 20th centuries by class differences of life chances – and also in comparison to those major new sources of conflict which modern developed societies generate today.

THE PARADOX OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

Politics in so far as it aims at creating and maintaining citizenship rights for all is characterized by a familiar, yet frightening paradox. Many of the measures which have to be taken in order to ensure a minimum of participation are such as to threaten the very rights which they create. In order to generalize certain life chances, institutions have to be set up which first restrict the life chances of those who already had them, and later, of those to whom they were newly given as well. In a certain sense, a policy of extending citizenship rights seems almost bound to defeat its own ends. Equal citizenship means organization, and organization means new restrictions of liberty.

Is this a necessary development? Are there not other systems related more directly to the individual? Is it not possible to control the new bureaucracies more effectively? At points such as this the great and the little utopias take off. An ombudsman, supposed to protect the citizen from his administration, may be able to help in the individual case; but he confirms the system precisely by doing so.

This cannot mean that we should renounce such measures. Citizenship is a necessary condition of freedom without privilege. But it means that we must see the dangers inherent in such a course. Few have seen these dangers more clearly than Max Weber in his political essays of 1918 on "Parliament and Government in the New Germany", where he speaks about the prison (Gehäuse

der Hörigkeit) of the future which bureaucratic organization with its specialization of trained skills, its delimitation of tasks, its rules and hierarchically ordered conditions of super- and subordination represents. People may one day be forced to live in this prison, just like the fellachs in ancient Egypt.

That there are many who do not, and cannot be expected to share this gloomy view, is in itself a source of conflict in modern societies. But even apart from Weber's gloom, the paradox of citizenship and bureaucracy may well be the point of departure for those antagonisms which already characterize the developed world.

THE CAUSES OF PROTEST

There are by now as many explanations as there are manifestations of student unrest, so that even the attempt to add another one to them has its awkwardness. Still, it seems reasonably well confirmed by a host of studies of the subject that underneath all local and specific issues which come to the fore in this process, there is a deep-seated, and almost desperate protest against the inability of modern society to effect change by participation.

The often incomplete promise of participation inherent in modern society is completed; and yet the young people realize that much of this promise is not going to be fulfilled.

The simultaneous recurrence of the humane dream of anarchy and the practical inhumanity of violence appear as step-brothers, if not brothers in this context. Anarchy, a society in which the power of men over men has been totally abolished, is the counter-image to bureaucracy; violence, a complete disrespect for all prevailing rules of the game, is apparently the only way to upset an established structure and thus begin a process of development which may end in the desired utopia.

The call for charismatic leadership, the amazing recurrence of regionalism and the many manifestations of a search for new "styles of life" like hippiedom, drug-taking, alcoholism and the sexual revolution, all these seemingly unrelated phenomena are in fact expressions of the same protest against the effects of a bureaucratized society.

THE CONTROLLING FORCES

It is sometimes claimed today, in view of student unrest and related phenomena, that modern societies are threatened by revolutionary forces "from the left", that they have to protect themselves against the "danger of anarchy". A revival of the demand for "law and order" is raised against outbreaks of violence in universities and elsewhere. While regarded as sinister revivals of historical authoritarianism by those at whom this demand is directed, it is only in part

maintained by traditional authoritarian groups bent on maintaining privilege against modernity. In terms of the new and future trends of conflict in developed societies, it is not the Wallaces who demand our attention, but those for whom "law and order" is a necessary condition of a planned, rational process of growth and development towards the year 2000 in the interest of the many, and of a more worthwhile society.

When Max Weber wrote about bureaucratization he used a fairly simple term to identify a group variously described also as "establishment", as a "power elite", or a "service class". The attempt in modern societies to control change has led to a transformation of the process of decision making as well as the groups involved. The amateur politician, has given way to an increasingly homogeneous group of professionals in a variety of positions: professional politicians, officials, advisers, "accredited" lobbyists and journalists, university professors, assistants in many kinds of places.

Various as these positions may be, they do not, paradoxically, include those of top decision makers. Rather, it is the common characteristic of those holding them that by the definitions of their places in society they are supposed to aid those who ultimately make decisions, to translate the decisions of others into the increasingly complex and scientific language of modern practice, to serve the incumbents of positions of power. However, most of the time these modern servants have no masters any more. While defined as aides, they are in fact rulers.

Both in the political organisation of society and in that of important social organizations and institutions scientifically trained experts have a crucial place, and defend it by reference to the technical nature of the decisions which have to be made. The question of political goals is rarely raised, indeed it may be pushed aside as irrelevant; it is as if the availability of means is the only relevant issue in political debate.

Imperceptibly, the character of politics changes under these conditions. Instead of reasoned decisions, we begin to find the search for adaptations to allegedly inevitable social, economic, demographic and even military developments. Adaptive politics, characteristic of the service class society, means that those who make decisions regard themselves as no more than executors of intrinsic requirements of a "system" which as such is never put in doubt. That there is little room for manoeuvre is one of the persistent claims of politicians of this kind. Their alliance with those servants - scientists, technicians, bureaucrats, ideologists - who promulgate the notion of technical politics is far-reaching and often successful.

There are theorists of adaptive politics who claim that if there are flaws in the political process of modern societies, they are technical flaws due to the

fact that we have not gone far enough in the direction of a "technetronic age".

The conflict of interest between industrial workers and university students is deep and incapable of solution in these terms. Workers - unlike many clerical workers - belong to the groups which have a lot to gain from a more scientifically organized society; students, especially those from middle-class families, ask for the place of the individual in such a society.

ALTERNATIVES IN PRACTICAL POLITICS

In the present situation there are three major political positions as far as the organization of our modern and highly bureaucratized society is concerned.

There are those who feel that modernization has gone far enough, and that the only remedy for an increasingly egalitarian and rationalized society is the defence of those traditions by which men were bound to each other in the past. Reagan, Powell, de Gaulle represent very different political positions, and the last in particular would certainly not be described correctly as a conservative; but in all these men there is a traditional authoritarian streak which still has a great deal of support even in the most developed societies. In its more extreme forms, this traditionalism may become associated with a demand for more leadership, and for the personalization of power.

There are, secondly, those who believe in the increasing "rationalization" of modern societies, in the rule of experts, and the effective organization of all areas of society. They see the hope of a more worthwhile future in the insistence on the enormous potential of human knowledge and its application to all problems facing man. Somewhere underneath these hopes there is often the Marxian distinction between a realm of necessity and a realm of liberty, and the notion that when the former is regulated most efficiently man is free to enjoy himself in the latter.

It is in this position that we find some of the elements of a "system" as Weber described it and as many young people fear it today. For this we have models right before our eyes in the socialist countries of the East which have for some time become brutally technocratic societies under the cloak of an increasingly irrelevant ideology.

The third major political position resulting from modern social developments has its extreme manifestations also. They are, above all, the utopian dreams of a society without power. But behind such extreme forms of expression there is the search for a society which may combine the achievements of modernity with an increase in human life chances. A new liberalism is at least conceivable; it is indeed real in a number of countries. Its basis lies in the social achievements for which liberals in the past have not been responsible, which were indeed often resisted by them. Its goals, however, refer to the threats to human liberty

inherent in a social development which tends to strengthen organization and bureaucracy rather than the individual and his life chances.

The present party system in the free societies betrays little trace of a clear division along these lines. Almost every party must be described as a tenuous coalition between at least two of the forces described here; and if we look at particular decisions, the coalitions often extend beyond the borders of individual parties. Radical students and authoritarian professors, autocratic leaders and modern economists, liberals of an old and of a new school of thought, and other incompatible groups frequently join forces – out of tradition, inertia, a misunderstanding of their own interests, or merely because a reformation of party systems meets with tremendous institutional difficulties in a society the major problem of which may be described as that of effecting change. It is a sign of progress that we have given up the ideology of the end of ideology. But having done so, we must now raise the questions on which the future of liberty may ultimately depend: How can we transform the existing organizations of political conflict into more representative ones? Which rules of the game are capable, under modern conditions, of preventing the success of the extreme manifestations inherent in each of these organizations? And, most important of all: How can we strengthen a policy oriented to the life chances of the individual rather than the efficiency of the whole or the privilege of the few?

DISCUSSION

The discussion of this item of the agenda was divided into two parts. The first part was dedicated to the analysis of the elements of instability in Western society. The second part to proposals for possible solutions.

ANALYSIS

In the analysis of the elements of instability a number of factors were presented by the participants in the discussion. They can be grouped under the following headings.

ALIENATION

An American participant stated that he could not accept the assumption in the American working paper that the alienation of the young was a dangerous and irreconcilable thing. This would only be true if one accepted the premise that the survival of society as we know it, with the existing social structure and contradictions, was the supreme goal of all its members. Neither the blacks nor the young would accept this. Another American speaker preferred to speak of polarization, not alienation of the young.

An International participant, supported by a British speaker, did not even think that youth was necessarily and systematically alienated. Not even from politics as such, but only from the present terms in which politics are played.

Several speakers stressed the fact that history has shown many unstable periods and that therefore the present unrest would fade away and disappear from the front pages. However, several other participants disagreed, stating that the present situation contained a number of new factors.

NEW FACTORS

A Danish participant said that the youth revolt was no minority matter. It may be carried by a minority of activists, but the May revolt in France of 1968 has shown that a minority can ignite an explosion, if there is some kind of general discontent.

An American participant presented three factors which he considered new in the present situation: the enormously increasing rate of social change; a great affluence, which is the result of a liberal society, and which is taken for granted by the young; and violence.

The importance of violence as a factor was confirmed by a Canadian speaker, who submitted that the tv-generation had lost the identity which their parents had and therefore had become violent.

A Dutch participant believed that one factor that has been neglected so far was the eroding influence of the educators themselves on the students. Their questioning of all values, their scepticism on the present day world and its conditions had contributed to the students unrest.

A German participant commented that in his view, it was a good thing that some educators teach their students to be critical of some of the basic assumptions of the society in which they are living. However, some speakers deplored the lack of discipline among the young, as well as their denial of the value of experience.

Various speakers agreed with the author of the American working paper that the Vietnam war was one of the major elements of social tension in the United States. There was, however, some disagreement whether the moral ambiguity of the war as such, or the failure of the American political and military strategy in Vietnam, together with the draft, was the major factor in the vehement protests.

A German participant submitted that it was useless to look for the factors which caused instability. One should concentrate the discussion on how the problems of the technocratic society could be solved. Solutions for a better functioning of the political system would take away many causes of unrest.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

An International participant agreed with the analysis of bureaucratic society given by the author of the German working paper. He questioned, however, the thesis that decision makers search only for adaptations to allegedly inevitable developments and rarely raise the question of political goals.

The author of the working paper replied that in the process of political decision making today, there was an immense difficulty in separating expertise from decisions about goals. Therefore, habit and custom ruled to an extent which was hardly justified and which made people think that far reaching innovation was hardly possible.

A Dutch participant acknowledged that change is necessary. But changes should be made by evolution and not by revolution. This evolution should be undertaken by this generation. But in this generation there is a division between those who think and study and those who act, this is true in politics, business and all other sectors of life. There is, however, an ignorance of each other's "métier". A dialogue between the two categories is mandatory.

PARTICIPATION

Many participants pointed to the lack of participation as a source of discontent. An American speaker described the complete helplessness of people as far as the possibility of exercising influence on the decisions that affect their day to day life is concerned. Children are brought up with the ideal of a participatory democracy. Later they are faced with institutions which refuse to yield them any participation and which they can neither understand nor control.

This great difference between promise and performance was also mentioned by another American speaker in relation to the black citizens of the United States. Participation by blacks has been largely symbolic, which raises the question of the black man's inclusion in participatory democracy.

A Swiss participant agreed with the principle of participation, but he warned that there always has to be a group of leaders who take responsibility for the important decisions and their implementation.

A British speaker stated that there should be far more study by labour and management on participation in the industrial decision making process.

A German participant added to this that both in university and the working class, attention was focussed on the question if participation signified that the establishment was responsible to some other establishment or to the individual man. According to him, participation meant that the individual should be given awareness of his role in the decision making process. This does not mean that everyone takes part in this decision making process, but that one spreads the participation in overall control.

THE FUTURE

Widely different prospects for the future were seen by various speakers.

A Belgian speaker – who had first expressed his deep regrets about the absence of Professor Pasmazoglou whom he knew as a good European in the best democratic sense of the word – expressed a rather optimistic view about the developments at the universities.

It should be possible to experiment with new democratic structures on the university level and train young people to carry responsibilities. This could have a multiplier effect.

This view was shared by a Canadian participant who agreed with the advice of a Dutch speaker that university authorities should try to respond unpredictably to student demands and that they should not try only to restore law and order.

An American participant saw the churches as the next institutions to come under attack.

A gloomy view was expressed by a Danish speaker who saw more violence ahead, because the leadership of the students rejected present day society completely.

An American participant added that in instability there is no regulation of conflict; a reaction of moral outrage could possibly end up in totalitarian politics through escalation.

More optimistic views were expressed by a French participant who believed that in the countries where the major agitation took place, France and the United States, there had been extremely exceptional conditions which probably would not exist in the future.

An American speaker expressed his faith in the young generation in general, citing many examples from personal experience. He believed that the one percent irrational and destructive elements received too much attention.

SUMMING UP

In his résumé of the analytical discussions an American participant mentioned some points on which he thought there was some kind of consensus.

1. Instability is not confined to a country, a color or an economic group. There is a contagion of discontent and probably of tactics and it is not confined to Europe or the United States.
2. In the advanced Western societies, the radical students tend to come from affluent backgrounds and not from the working class.
3. Those who have worked with a number of the militant young are impressed with their knowledge, ability and potential. Therefore they tend to be more

optimistic about the young than those who are somewhat more remote.

4. What is happening among the young may be symptomatic for other parts of society. There is need to bring more humanity into the political, economic and social institutions. Timely reforms are preferable to revolutionary change.
5. Underlying the present discontents are both ancient moral problems; man and his values, his spontaneity, his freedom, his relationship to other men, his institutions and – a very new one – his fear of becoming a reflection of the computer.

We will have to deal with these moral problems together with the political and social problems before us and they will affect all that we do or leave undone.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

During the second part of the discussion a number of possible solutions were presented.

NEW VISION

Several speakers stressed the necessity of giving the youth a new vision of the future of our society; a common goal that could be striven after.

An International participant supported by a French, a British and a Belgian participant, stated that the building of a United Europe should be this common goal.

An American participant suggested that a world-wide fight on poverty could act as a unifying force. It could focus the attention and involvement of the whole world, because it concerns the industrial and developing nations alike. This proposal was wholeheartedly supported by an International participant and two other American speakers.

It was also emphasized that all nations should be ready to enter a moratorium on further nuclear armament. This could be important as the threat of thermo-nuclear warfare is considered as one of the sources of stress on youth and gives rise to many apocalyptic views.

PARTICIPATION

Many speakers argued that the central issue of the future will be the question of participation. In this connection a number of proposals were presented.

A Norwegian and an Austrian participant concentrated their proposals on

the democratic parliamentary system, so that national parliaments could really exercise control. The decision making process in political parties, universities and industry should also become more open and democratic. These proposals were supported by a Belgian, a Canadian and a Swiss participant.

Lowering of the voting age was another measure proposed by several participants. This would not be a panacea, but a symbolic gesture of some consequence.

An American speaker thought that in the United States there is now more participation than ever before. In practice this has meant that all groups were opposing the others which showed the need for bargaining. A Dutch speaker, however, called this theory of bargaining an elitist theory of democracy which is based on the distrust of the possibilities for the exercise of reason by the mass.

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY AND MORALITY

An American participant regretted that instability was often regarded as attacking the status quo and therefore rejected. It was necessary to trace out the obsolescent logic and practices of our society and our system and try to define the logic of a new civilization which we have helped create but not yet understood.

In this new civilization the use of force will be increasingly ineffective and dangerous. One pays a very high price for force and gets very little in return. A Dutch participant commented that the use of force by the constabulary during the student revolts was only a reaction against and the result of the use of force by those elements of society which generally denounce it.

The American speaker mentioned before stressed the necessity of a return to morality. The new civilization was manageable only if one returned to the rationality of the personal relations between individual people. The young press a college administrator or a policeman to the point where he has no mechanical answers, then they watch his response. If he goes for the police, they have got him. If, like Mr. Lindsay or others, he has the courage to walk the streets alone and deal with the "one-to-one logic", he walks safely.

Several American speakers and a French speaker asked for reform of the obsolete educational system, which keeps the young in school much too long. Education should be spread over the whole life cycle of the individual. A Dutch participant added that the goal of education should be not only the transmission of knowledge but also the training of the faculty of reason.

Another point in this respect was raised by an American speaker when he stated that technology should be turned to humane pursuit.

The young look at technology as their master, but it can be and should be

their servant. Technology should be turned by government and industry to fulfill the needs of the 70 percent of the world population who live at sub-standard levels and it should not benefit just a handful.

GOVERNMENT MEASURES

Some proposals were made with regard to the tasks of governments.

A number of speakers called for a vast program of urban development with a steady flow of money, in order to clean up the cities, promote public transport and, in general, take away the sources of stress which "big city life" puts on the individual citizen.

Two American speakers called for a national service program, a cause to which many young and old people could respond.

SUMMING UP

In summing up the discussions, the author of the German working paper said that after listening to the debates he had a growing awareness of the complexity of translating the analysis and the intentions on which one agrees into practical policies.

When trying to think of solutions various people had very different sources of instability in mind. There were those who had uppermost in their minds the sources of instability connected with the establishment of equal citizenship for all. They dealt with problems of poverty, the international class struggle, the developing countries and the immediate problems of non-inclusion of youth. On the other hand there were those who were more preoccupied with the problems brought to the fore by students and other young people who believe that the very affluence the others are longing for will create new problems, very similar to the ones we have had before.

It would be easy to show that those who ask for equal citizenship could be the fiercest opponents of those whose concern is the new affluent society. Still they have certain elements in common namely a common concern of both groups about the ability of our societies to effect the necessary changes.

This could be the starting point for trying to find political solutions for both kinds of problems. There was a need for people who have a clear sense of the common goals of all divergent groups and for people who have the ability to develop political solutions and put them into practice.

The author of the American working paper concentrated his final remarks on the question of how one could create more effective political institutions. It will be necessary to create mechanisms of change. Since we cannot do every-

thing we want to do at once, it is necessary to create priorities, which should be chosen according to their effectiveness. Next, it would be necessary to learn forecasting.

Man has lived a long time on the basis of adaptation and what is needed now is anticipation.

ITEM II

CONFLICTING ATTITUDES WITHIN THE WESTERN
WORLD TOWARDS RELATIONS WITH THE USSR
AND OTHER COMMUNISTS STATES OF EASTERN
EUROPE IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS

The background for discussion of this item consisted of a paper prepared by an International participant. The paper had been distributed before the meeting.

SUMMARY OF THE WORKING PAPER

AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

The occupation of Czechoslovakia has proved that far from a European security system being possible without the United States, the determination of the Soviet Union to control eastern Europe has left room only for a dialogue between the superpowers. Detente, European style (*all* European styles, gaullist and non-gaullist) is blocked; detente "à la superpowers" remains open. They alone seem to have room for manoeuvre.

For all that, there is no guarantee they will succeed in achieving limited truces. Even if they do so on the narrow front of missile limitations, there may be no willingness or ability to extend understanding further afield. Crisis centres like the Middle East are tests of the capacity of the superpowers to moderate either their rivalry in the world or the freedom of allies and clients to drag them into situations they cannot properly control.

Nevertheless, the logic of Russo-American fear of the nuclear arms race and the slow but potentially chaotic diffusion of power around the world is powerful and persistent. On the other hand the superpowers seem to have a common desire to concentrate on internal issues, such as economic reform or the cities, and damp down the costs of an arms race subject to increasing risks and falling returns.

The growing common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are worldwide and they now mark the end of the Eurocentric system in which the European powers are still stuck. Russia does not see Europeans as *inter-*

locuteurs valables; the only nation with analogous worldwide concerns is the United States.

From a European point of view, greater understanding between the superpowers is basically hopeful. First, anything which helps maintain nuclear deterrence as near as possible to the present well understood and quasi-absolute balance of terror is favourable to European security. Second, self-restraint by the superpowers is a necessary pendant to the non-proliferation treaty, with its invidious distinction between second-class non-nuclear powers with material obligations and first-class nuclear ones without. Third, Europe has an interest in the superpowers contributing more than they have done to the long-term security of the world, which Europeans can no longer provide for themselves. Fourth, in the most narrowly European terms, a us-ussr detente holds out historically novel hopes of Europe's becoming a relative backwater while the power struggles flare up elsewhere. This might even, ultimately, help detente (from Brest to Brest as a German journalist has called it) between the smaller powers of Europe.

A new problem may be the tension in American priorities between Russia and medium or small allies in Europe (and elsewhere) as the non-proliferation treaty negotiations have shown.

The more far-reaching issue is, however, that the idea that the United States and the Soviet Union potentially have an exclusive relationship has become embedded in establishment thinking in the West; and this marks a watershed in politics. The superpowers will have to address their minds mostly to arms control and they will have to look more toward the rising region of the Far East, where the undefined threat of China looms and Japan continues its breath-taking ascension to economic gigantism, and less towards Europe which, whatever its latent crises, looks like being as near to an area of the *status quo* as one can get on earth in coming years. Changes in America's policy are less likely to come from changed assessments of the local situation in Europe than from its continued slow sinking in the scale of priorities.

CONSEQUENCES OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS

This change is taking place against a background of resurgent social conflicts in the industrial world after a generation of exceptional civil quiet since the early days of the Cold War.

Social instability is frequently associated with violence and even international violence. Europe was an extremely disturbed continent before both world wars. If a slump occurred, this would almost certainly radicalize an already potentially radical situation, with incalculable effects. It could lead to author-

itarian regimes in many countries. But that does not necessarily imply large-scale international violence.

If violence comes, it is more likely to do so in other ways: perhaps tensions in eastern Europe leading the Soviet Union to over-react; or the increasingly fluid Balkan-Mediterranean-Middle East frontier of NATO erupting in disorders – national (as in Spain or Greece) or international (as between Greece and Turkey, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia or once more Israel and the Arabs) – and igniting major crises in Europe. None of these looks very likely to shake Europe now; but a period of social upheavals could make such threats look very different.

Still, the main effect of social instability on foreign policy is likely to be less dramatic and more insidious: the injection of isolationist attitudes into national policies from both the left and the right. The effect on the United States could be unilateralism; and on Western Europe fragmentation.

There are two aspects to neo-isolationism: the revival of ideology and the revival of the state. The revival of ideology grafted on to older class or ethnic struggles is radicalizing the young and the left. Stress is placed on "values" and "man" rather than on the last generation's idol, planning, which, as "organization", has now become the new devil, associated with technocrats, "manipulation", and alienated individuals. This is a familiar twentieth century problem. There has been a regular pendular swing between movements for international organization (after both world wars) and the International of radicals of goodwill (the Workers of the World before 1914 and in the 30s and now the Students of the World). There is a compulsion, explicable but unfortunate, to regard the two as competitive rather than complementary.

For Europe this would mean fragmentation which makes it incapable of producing a coherent impact even as a giant economic neutral.

This is the point where European and American priorities meet. The need for the United States to exploit the opportunities for dialogue with the Soviet Union and yet not lose the assets of cooperation with allies built up across the world since the war, is more than an American interest. The United States since the war has had two complementary strategies. One has been to maintain the power balance with the Soviet Union. The other has been to develop a political process, above all in the monetary and trade fields, with allies inside the *Lebensraum* provided by the nuclear frontier. It is vital to maintain what Professor Brzezinski has called this "Community of Developed Nations" and if possible extend it.

If NATO, however, becomes part of a system where Americans and Europeans feel alienated from one another, economic cooperation, without even breaking down, can lose its political magnetism. The temptation for the United States,

faced by hopes of dialogue with Russia and difficulties with allies, is to simplify foreign relations by an increasing unilateralism in the Johnsonian manner. This could be a fatal error, particularly as the Two will find it easier to incur the odium of a Dual Hegemony than to make one work.

PRIMARY ISSUES

The immediate limits of discussion between the United States and its European allies on detente with Eastern Europe are set by neither but by the Soviet Union. The Russians have shown up the Western Europeans as rather naive marxists for thinking that growing economic and other contacts might lead to political relaxation between the halves of Europe. They will brook no threats, direct or indirect, to their political and military control of the eastern half. Bridge-building will remain the most "aggressive" Western policy towards Eastern Europe until the Russians take a less alarmist view of reform in the satellites. Nevertheless, the occupation of Prague seems, so far, not to have slowed up the limited but growing East-West trade, or other contacts. All the Europeans can do for the moment is to continue increasing these and wait for better times.

The primary issues for the moment are, therefore, those of intra-Western relations. They are both economic and strategic. With regard to economic issues, so far as trade is concerned, attention will probably be concentrated in the coming years on absorbing the effects of the Kennedy round; holding off protectionism, particularly in the light of the rapid ascension of Japan; and trying to go beyond tariff cuts to a more organic view of how freer international trade can be managed. This, in the last resort, will depend on how successfully the world's monetary system is managed. For all the difficulties, the tendency on this last point seems to be in the necessary direction of more collective management. The economic politics of the West will be as vital in the early Seventies as at every stage since the war.

With regard to strategic issues, President Nixon has shown he appreciates the potential impact of Russo-American talks on Western Europe. This is more than a question of climate: anything going beyond the narrowest self-limitations of intercontinental missiles by the superpowers will edge toward the area of disengagement in Europe. But, whatever the President's goodwill, the Europeans will be in no position to make their priorities felt if, once again, they speak at cross-purposes. To produce a voice that is heard, they must speak as often as possible as one. The minimum might be to set up a ministerial committee, with an eminent political figure as secretary, to coordinate their view points. Subject to the inclusion of France, the wgu would probably be a

better model than a European caucus in NATO, since in NATO the number of participants immediately rises to unmanageable proportions.

Nevertheless, in the end there is no substitute for material weight. This is relevant to the issue of withdrawal of United States forces from Germany, which was coming to a head in Congress when the occupation of Czechoslovakia temporarily scotched it. In the future, after a Russo-American agreement and the first reaffirmations of Western solidarity, one must expect the pressure to scale down American troops in Germany to 1-3 divisions to revive in the early Seventies. This example would almost certainly be followed, if not preceded, by a Canadian trek home. Since the Russians cannot in any real sense withdraw from Europe, NATO would be left with a potentially dangerous reliance on light police actions at one end of the scale of deterrence and massive retaliation by a vulnerable America at the other. This could be a real factor in shaping the pressures of diplomacy in Europe in a direction more favourable to the Soviet Union.

American acquiescence in the *status quo* delivers Russia from serious fears of German reunification. This in turn weakens whatever arguments Russia may have seen for West European integration as a container for Germany. The tendency to see such integration as the longterm threat to Russian predominance in Europe will be strengthened by lack of an alternative. If, in addition, the Americans feel they have less to fear from Russia, their enthusiasm for West European unity, already less energetic, might wane. The West Europeans themselves, less sure of their framework, might be more likely to re-insure with both superpowers. The price to the Russians of keeping the Germans in two minds in Europe (integration against further contacts with East Germans) might correspondingly fall. In such a case, Western Europe would remain weak, divided and, in effect, "Finlandised".

In this light, the arguments for more European integration in defence are powerful and urgent. If the Europeans show signs of coming together, this will give the Administration arguments in Congress to postpone troop withdrawals. If they do take place, greater unity would give the Europeans better means and confidence to cope with the resulting situation. If the Europeans had coherent and mobile forces, conceived equally for operations in Germany or on NATO's flanks, they might be able to maintain credible levels of non-nuclear defence without incredible increases in budgets. That this implies integration is suggested not only by the collective inefficiency of the present several defence efforts in Europe but also by the experience of the United States where Mr. McNamara produced big savings in procurement by unifying many purchases for the three services.

The way forward for the moment might be to set up a Wise Men's group of

eminent non-governmental figures to see how more flexibility and mobility can be given to European forces within NATO (for instance, by developing NATO's Ace mobile forces for specifically European ends). This group could stay in business on a "rolling plan" basis, looking at problems a generation of weapons and policies ahead. Though inevitably advisory and no more at this stage, it could, if authoritative, pave the way intellectually and politically for a later European Defence Commission.

DISCUSSION

During the discussion of this item of the agenda, several speakers gave their views on the political situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

THE SOVIET UNION

A British participant thought that there was very little change for the better in the internal situation of the Soviet Union. The same was true with regard to the Soviet attitude of suspicion to the outside world and the long term communist aims which were united with Russian ambitions. There were signs of a move in the Soviet Union to what was called Bonapartism; it was unknown where the police and the army stand. The situation looked rather worrying.

According to a German participant, the Soviet leaders were at present under a heavy strain. The impact of the invasion in Czechoslovakia and of the Breznev doctrine on communists inside and outside the Warsaw Pact was disastrous for the leading role of Soviet communism. It had destroyed the unity of world communism; the fight for polycentrism, predicted by Togliatti was on everybody's mind. This was fully understood by Moscow. This view was confirmed by another British participant.

Two Norwegian speakers, supported by many other delegates, expressed their great concern about the considerable increase in Soviet naval activity on the high seas.

EASTERN EUROPE

An Austrian participant thought that the author of the working paper and some speakers took a somewhat static view of the situation in Eastern Europe. Tremendous changes were taking place, the Soviet Union was in the middle of a colonial crisis. In many countries of the Soviet bloc there was a rising nationalism. In this respect an Italian speaker said that in some Eastern European countries a struggle was taking place to remove politics from the economy. A better balance was sought between war production and peace consumption.

With regard to relations between the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe, a British participant believed that countries like Roumania and Yugoslavia would fight the Russian armies, if they were invaded.

DETENTE

Many speakers agreed with the author of the working paper that under these circumstances any form of detente between European countries was blocked. Bridge-building would remain the most "aggressive" Western policy towards Eastern Europe, until the Russians took a less alarmist view of reform in the satellites. A Norwegian participant called in this respect the possibilities of bilateral contacts between East and West European countries illusory.

A Belgian speaker thought that in the nearby future the most interesting developments would take place not between the blocs, but inside them.

However, many participants agreed with an Austrian speaker that it would be necessary to keep the lines of communication open.

The Norwegian speaker mentioned before, supported by a Dutch participant, thought that economic and cultural relations between Eastern and Western Europe should be continued and, if possible, strengthened.

THE SUPERPOWERS

The thesis of the author of the working paper that the United States and the Soviet Union had a common interest in a dialogue, was supported by a number of speakers.

A Norwegian speaker said that Europe would do well to accept as a fact in the present situation that peace depended on the two super-powers.

An American speaker emphasized that in the future there was a possibility that four big powers would sit around the table: the Soviet Union, China, the United States and Europe. The presence of the United States would depend on the participation of Europe. There were a number of things which the United States could not do alone and which Europe and the United States could do very well in partnership.

In this respect a number of speakers, including two French and an American participant, believed that Japan was the great emerging power. It was therefore necessary to bring this country into an alliance with the West.

SECURITY CONFERENCE

A Swiss participant mentioned the European security conference proposed by the Soviet Union. He thought that such a conference would not serve any purpose for the West, since it was not the task of the West to stabilize

Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. In this view he was supported by an American speaker.

A Turkish participant thought that the Soviet Union would not be opposed to the participation of the United States and Canada in a European security conference, but there would certainly be disagreement on the conditions of admittance of these two countries.

A German speaker believed that a conference within two or three years would be a risky manoeuvre for the Soviet Union, because its Warsaw Pact partners would then have recovered from the blow of the Czech invasion and would therefore again feel more free to act on their own.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

The discussion on the developments in the Atlantic Alliance centered around the public opinion in the United States on American commitments in Europe, the future of European unity, the situation in the Atlantic Alliance and the criticism of the younger generation on NATO.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

An American participant stressed the fact that it was questionable if the American people wanted to play the role of the world power described in the working paper. There were in the United States signs of withdrawal. This withdrawal was not limited to the United States; France had withdrawn from NATO, Great Britain from South East Asia and East of Suez and Canada was reducing its troops in NATO. Part of American public opinion was asking why the United States could not do the same thing. There was no doctrine of isolationism, but many people wanted to withdraw American troops from Europe, which would also mean the withdrawal of nuclear weapons.

This view was confirmed by other American speakers. One of them added that this would not mean the withdrawal of American business and investment, because the European market was still the most important foreign market.

About this last point an Italian participant remarked that American investment in Europe should be more constructive and help Europeans to find greater strength in the world market. The difference in power is too big, there is definitely a lack of balance.

A German speaker said that the remarks of the American participants about withdrawal were not entirely new to Europe. The possibility of withdrawal under certain circumstances was known and had been feared for years.

FUTURE OF EUROPEAN UNITY

A Dutch participant thought that in questions of European unity one should not speak in terms of desirabilities, but in terms of facts. Everybody agreed that Europe should unite. But the underlying assumption that there was a Europe was wrong. The people of Europe were no more akin to each other than they were, for instance, to the Americans. Europeans were not nationalists – except for de Gaulle, but he is gone – but they were faced with their national situation. (As an example of a national situation the speaker mentioned the impact of the relations between the Flemish and Walloon population in Belgium on Benelux cooperation). Under these circumstances it was difficult to be optimistic about the possibilities of European unity, also because the young were not interested in it.

Many participants believed that Europe could not survive without a policy of its own. In this respect an Italian and a French speaker thought that a common commercial policy and a policy of industrial growth and open markets were very necessary.

A British participant strongly emphasized the urgency of monetary reform. As far as the immediate situation was concerned, one should take the fever out of markets and tranquilize the situation for some time ahead. The United States should make clear where it stood in regard to the monetary system and there should come an end to the ambivalence of governments concerning the relationship between outward and inward investment and balances of payments, which so far have bedevilled the development of the multinational corporation and the multinational economy.

With regard to political union and integration in defence in Europe, many speakers believed that there was a need for progress. Two Norwegian participants thought that defence integration should take place within an Atlantic community. An Icelandic speaker agreed with this view.

There was, however, no clear conception of what kind of Europe should be built. One of the Norwegian speakers mentioned earlier said that a united Europe should be a united Western Europe within the Atlantic Alliance. Europe as an independent third force was an illusion and also disastrous, as this would mean a third big nuclear power.

A Danish participant, however, stated that among others a strong independent Europe would be important for the third world, which had so long been locked in between the Soviet Union and the United States.

GERMANY

The German question was raised mostly in connection with the relations to the Soviet Union.

A German participant pointed to a growing interest of the Russians as far as the German attitude vis à vis China was concerned. Fears were expressed in the Soviet press of Russian encirclement by a German-Chinese coalition. On the other hand, the Soviet Union sought the dialogue with Germany.

Another German speaker denied that the Federal Republic would try to make a deal with China in order to threaten the Soviet Union. He also stated that it was impossible that Germany would take the leadership in Western Europe. No German leader nor the population believed in such a thing.

NATO

An American participant thought that there was no inherent incompatibility between European unity and a strong Western alliance. On the contrary, until and unless true detente – which would mean dissolution of the Warsaw Pact – had been accomplished, it could not be in the interest of Europe or the United States to relax the Western alliance.

This position was supported by several speakers. A French participant added that it should be possible for France to rejoin NATO. This would depend, however, on the possibility of transforming the alliance.

Another Frenchman added that a recent report of the French Chief of staff had shown that the strategy of a “*défense à toutes azimuts*” was worthless; only in NATO France could defend itself.

A Canadian speaker pointed out that the recent decision of the Canadian Government to review its NATO policy did not mean that Canada would become a neutral country. On the contrary, Canada had decided to reaffirm its dedication to collective security and to NATO. However, at the same time a phased reduction of the military contribution to NATO was foreseen.

A Dutch speaker asked why an orientation as had taken place in Canada, had been done unilaterally. He regretted that such a review could not be brought into a common framework.

NATO AND THE CREDIBILITY GAP

During the discussion a number of speakers addressed themselves to the question of what the author of the working paper had called “an intense dislike of balance-of-power politics” by the young and the left, which led “to a kind of isolationism with an internationalist veneer”.

An American speaker in this respect stated that the new generation had no

chance to remember the second world war and how to organize a durable peace.

A Danish participant explained how difficult it was for the young to accept the status quo in international politics without any possibility of change. Either they lived in a small country which had no influence on world politics or in a powerful country where one was so far from the political institutions that any participation was an illusion.

How could one explain the need of NATO to the young when they gave nothing to the principle of status quo? All alternatives to a status quo had many nationalistic trends. The young generation would take over in the next decades, but they were not too happy about doing this on the political premises of today.

An American speaker thought that the young generation might ask questions on the inclusion of Greece and Portugal in the so called free Western world; why the possibility and necessity of an American anti-ballistic missile system was not discussed and what were the responsibilities of the superpowers vis à vis the developing nations.

A Dutch speaker thought that the new generation could be convinced of the indispensability of NATO and of a Western European political union if NATO were defended more as a political framework than as a military framework.

Stressing the military balance between East and West by NATO and the analogy of the present situation with the thirties was wrong. He supported the American speaker mentioned above with regard to the NATO-membership of Portugal and Greece. Another Dutch speaker answered to that that the question of Greece and Portugal in NATO would be no problem if one looked at NATO as a purely military organization and not as a political and ideological one.

The necessity of a sense of history by the young was underlined by an American speaker. He believed that it should be possible to bring younger men in the councils of NATO and other organizations.

SUMMING UP

In summing up the discussions the author of the working paper said that he thought that there was a high degree of agreement among a number of participants who were dealing with the organization of the world and the way in which one should react to the given situation.

On the other hand there was a group who was dealing with horizons and romantics of human aspirations. He thought that the anti-Americanism of many young radicals to which some speakers had referred was not anti-Americanism as such but an objection to balance of power politics.

He agreed with the many speakers who had stressed as new elements in a relatively stable situation the fast rise of Japan as a big power, the Russian maritime expansion and the possibilities of change within Eastern Europe where the status quo, imposed by the Soviet Union after Prague, could very well be only temporary.

With regard to European unity he thought that one should remind that the difficulties during the integration process had laid in Europe and not in the attitude of the United States toward Europe. The monetary and trading system had to be intensified in order to keep up with the very rapid developments. Next to this the Europeans should act more effectively to be able to deal with the United States in the fields of the new technologies, the international company, ocean space, satellites etc. because in these there is no balance.

It was rightly pointed out that one should not underestimate the social and political differences within Europe. At the same time it would be a mistake to think that one could not act because of this. Europeans were trying to make their societies effective in the world on very specific points without working toward a total fusion of these societies. In this regard the next two or three years would be the testing time.

* * *

Before closing the Meeting, His Royal Highness expressed the gratitude of all those present to Mr.Terkelsen, Mr.Sørensen, Mr.Marott, the other Danish hosts and Mr. Høegh for all they had done to make the Meeting such a succes. The Prince also expressed his deep appreciation to the authors of the working papers and thanked the members of the Secretariat as well as the interpreters for their excellent work.

A United States participant thanked His Royal Highness on behalf of all participants for the fascinating and stimulating Meeting.